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Abstract 
In this paper, I provide a framework to guide research in emotional intelligence. Studies 
conducted up to the present bear on a conception of emotional intelligence as pertaining to 
the domain of consciousness, and investigate the construct with a correlational approach. As 
an alternative, I explore processes underlying emotional intelligence, introducing the 
distinction between conscious and automatic processing as a potential source of variability in 
emotionally intelligent behavior. Empirical literature is reviewed to support the central 
hypothesis that individual differences in emotional intelligence may be best understood by 
considering the way individuals automatically process emotional stimuli. Providing 
directions for research, I encourage the integration of experimental investigation of processes 
underlying emotional intelligence with correlational analysis of individual differences, and 
foster the exploration of the automaticity component of emotional intelligence. 
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A New Look at Emotional Intelligence: A Dual-Process Framework 
Since the construct of Emotional Intelligence (EI) was introduced in the scientific 
psychological literature by Salovey and Mayer (1990), a variety of opinions about emotional 
intelligence as a useful psychological construct have been expressed, ranging from 
unconditional glorification, such as that emotional intelligence is the best predictor of success 
in life (Goleman, 1995) to strenuous denigration, such as that emotional intelligence is an 
invalid concept because individuals cannot reason with emotions (Locke, 2005).   From 2001 
to the present, leading journals including Emotion (2001, Volume 1, Issue 3), Academy of 
Management Review (2003, Volume 28, Issue 2), Psychological Inquiry (2004, Volume 17, 
Issue 3), and Journal of Organizational Behavior (2005, Volume 26, Issue 4) have devoted 
commentaries and special issues to controversial questions regarding EI, such as the 
definition of the construct, its measurement, and the components that should be included in a 
model of emotional intelligence. The debate is particularly fervent because considering the 
ability to deal with emotion in oneself and others as a form of intelligence is, in many ways, 
groundbreaking. Up to thirty years ago the term emotional intelligence would have seemed 
like an oxymoron: Emotion and cognition were considered opposite forces, reflecting a 
dualistic conception of instinct and mind (Damasio, 1994). Recently, research has 
demonstrated the interplay of emotional and cognitive processes in human functioning 
(Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Phelps, 2005), and the flourishing of articles on 
emotional intelligence to some extent reflects this paradigm shift. 
 Despite the excitement derived from considering emotional intelligence (EI) as a 
‘novel’ form of intelligence, deep criticisms also have been raised. Researchers lament broad 
and unclear theoretical definition (Becker, 2003; Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004); lack 
of incremental validity (Davis, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Landy, 2005; Matthews, Roberts, 
& Zeidner, 2004; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004); and poor psychometric standards of 
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current measures of EI (Becker, 2003; Conte, 2005; Davis, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; 
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004).  
My purpose in the present paper is to advance research in the field by addressing 
some of these concerns. I propose to reconceptualize EI within the scientific literature of 
social cognition and emotion, in particular dual-process models, and to use this framework to 
clarify controversial results regarding the theoretical definition and incremental validity of EI. 
Although attempts to ground EI within emotion and intelligence literature exist 
(Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004), little attention has been 
placed on considering a literature particularly important to the social psychologist, namely 
work in social cognition, and connecting it to research on EI. Furthermore, most research in 
EI has been conducted with a differential approach, overlooking the psychological processes 
underlying individual differences in EI. I contend that the distinction between conscious and 
automatic processing in emotional experience is fundamental to both understanding the 
psychological dynamics of EI and accounting for additional variability in emotional 
intelligent behaviors. 
Theoretical Background 
Two schools of thought characterize current literature on EI. On the one hand, ability 
models conceive EI as a form of intelligence, encompassing abilities to manage emotions 
(e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1997). On the other hand, mixed models conceptualize EI as 
represented by a wider range of skills, including competence and traits such as zeal, 
persistence, self-control (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995). Approaches differ with respect 
to not only the definition of EI, but also its assessment. Whereas ability models rely on 
performance measures, mixed models mainly use self-report questionnaires. In performance 
measures a correct answer may be identified: individuals are asked to pick from a list which 
emotion best describes how a person is feeling in a hypothetical situation. In contrast, self-
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report measures allow for a variety of answers: individuals are asked to indicate how good 
they are at identifying other people’s emotions. In this case, there is no correct answer – the 
emotion describing the person’s feeling – but individuals are allowed to express their opinion 
modulating it on a likert-type scale.  
Research reveals that the mixed models of EI are most susceptible to criticism 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 
2002; Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003; Day & Caroll, 2004; Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Hartel, 2003; 
Lopes et al., 2004; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). In 
consideration of these findings, and consistent with the position of some authors (Ashkanasy 
& Daus, 2005) who advocate for converging efforts toward the most promising field of 
research in EI, namely ability models, I conceptualize EI as the ability to process emotional 
information by means of specific skills. Hence, I embrace the definition of Mayer and 
Salovey (1997, p. 5) that EI is “the ability to perceive emotions, to access and generate 
emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge, and to 
reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth.” I employ 
their model based on the distinction of four subabilities or ‘branches’ of EI as the starting 
point of my theoretical revision. 
I investigate the possibility that Mayer and Salovey’s model may be improved by 
positing that conscious and automatic processes come into play. I employ the theoretical 
framework of dual-process models – which assume that behavior depends on the interplay of 
automatic and conscious processes – to describe processes underlying EI and integrate it with 
the analysis of individual differences in EI.   
Throughout the paper the term automatic is used with a generic connotation; it 
indicates processes that possess one or more characteristics of automaticity: unintentionality, 
efficiency, uncontrollability, and unawareness. As the level of discussion requires a more 
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fine-grained approach to automaticity, I introduce a specific terminology to refer to different 
aspects of automatic processing.   
 This paper is organized as follows: I first present an overview of Mayer and Salovey’s 
EI model (1997), elucidating how their theorization lacks attention to processes that may be 
involved in EI, in particular automatic processes. I then support the hypothesis that automatic 
processes play a role in EI by describing research that shows automaticity in emotional 
processing and its effect on behavior. I next introduce a reconceptualization of EI according 
to a process-oriented approach, with particular attention to a dual-process framework, in 
which I suggest that individual differences in EI may be associated with differences in the 
way conscious and automatic processing operates in high and low EI individuals. 
Specifically, I propose to focus the attention on processes characterized by lack of awareness, 
named unconscious processes, and to distinguish the psychological mechanisms associated to 
the presence or absence of awareness as a way to understand the automaticity component of 
EI. I finally discuss assessment methods aligned with the reconceptualization of EI and 
provide directions for future research.  
Mayer and Salovey Four-Branch Model 
The term EI as described by Mayer and Salovey (1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) 
refers to the extent to which people use emotions to guide and inform their thinking. 
Processing of emotional information is part of everyday life; yet, people differ in the way 
they pay attention to and rely on their emotional abilities: Some use emotions in a productive 
way, for example to improve the quality of their performance, or to accomplish their goals. 
Others use emotion in a less efficient way, for example to direct attention away from the task 
they are engaged in. 
The main characteristic of the model is that it considers EI as an ability. The authors 
emphasize the intelligence component, which underlies the mental abilities required to 
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process emotional information, as opposed to dispositional components responsible for 
categories of behavior, like traits. For this reason, Salovey and Mayer (1990) claim that EI 
cannot be assessed with self-report measures, which tap into personality constructs rather 
than abilities. Instead, they propose to assess EI by means of performance-based measures. 
The test the authors introduced to measure EI – the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, 2002) – is composed of a series of tasks, such as recognition of 
emotional stimuli and analysis of emotional situations, for which a correct answer may be 
identified. Consistent with Mayer and Salovey’s theorization of EI as a general factor 
arranged in 4 subabilities, the test provides a general EI score and four scores for each ability 
or branch of the model: (a) the ability to perceive emotions in oneself and in others, (b) the 
ability to use emotion to facilitate thought, (c) the ability to understand emotions, and (d) the 
ability to manage emotions.  
The first branch regards individual differences in perceiving emotions in oneself and 
in others. Recognition of other individuals’ feelings occurs mainly through the perception of 
nonverbal cues, like facial expressions and body language. Although the ability to perceive 
basic emotions is universal (Ekman, 1989), people differ in how accurately they perceive 
their own and others’ emotions. Some people may be resistant or unable to understand how 
they are feeling; others may tend to perceive emotions as pleasant or unpleasant only; a few 
people may possess a vast repertoire of emotional nuances to describe their and others’ 
emotional experience. 
The second branch represents a more complex ability than emotion perception: using 
emotions to enhance or facilitate thought.  This ability plays a role when people make a 
choice by anticipating how they would feel in a certain situation or when they pay attention 
to what a certain feeling is communicating in a decision-making process. Individuals differ in 
the way they use emotional information to pursue their goals.  
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The third branch refers to understanding emotion, and includes knowledge about the 
causes, the consequences, and the evolution of emotional reaction. Individuals high in EI are 
able to figure out the impact of their behavior on other people and use this knowledge to 
improve interpersonal relationships. Emotion understanding encompasses empathy, which is 
the ability to experience others’ feelings.  
The previous three branches constitute the foundation upon which the most 
sophisticated ability can flourish: management of emotions. This branch is based on 
awareness of emotional reaction as well as regulation of mood and emotions in oneself and in 
others. Individuals may be more or less successful at improving bad mood or at attuning 
themselves to the mood required in a particular circumstance.  
Mayer and Salovey’s work on EI undoubtedly presents advantages compared to other 
theorizations (e.g., Bar-on, 1997; Goleman, 1995); for instance, the authors’ definition of EI 
as composed by four clearly defined abilities – as opposed to the blanket definition of EI as a 
mixture of skills, competence, and personality characteristics – allows for testing theoretical 
assumptions, for example that EI should be treated as an ability (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
Furthermore, the test they introduced to measure EI – the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test or MSCEIT – has been improved during the years and has become the best 
ability measure of EI in circulation. Despite these acknowledgements, it seems as if some 
features of EI have not been considered in their model. Limitations of Mayer and Salovey’s 
model are considered next.  
Where Do We Go From Here: Looking Into Mayer and Salovey’s EI Model 
Among the top list of priorities for research in EI, Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2004, 
p. 211) argue for “understanding the processes underlying EI.”  Indeed, their model is 
predominantly descriptive. The authors describe the abilities that should be included in a 
model of EI without developing an in depth analysis of  what processes might be involved to 
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produce them; their emphasis on general qualities (Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004), 
such as the ability to regulate emotions, says little about the specific functions that 
differentiate high and low emotionally intelligent individuals. Mayer and Salovey follow a 
psychometric taxonomic approach to EI: Their main interest was in identifying a reliable and 
valid test to measure differences in EI and to correlate the test’s results to various outcomes. 
However, they did not include in this approach the investigation of what processes exactly 
lead to successful emotion-based performance. The issue of clarifying the nature of EI may 
be addressed by inquiring into how high and low EI individuals process emotion information. 
The analysis of processes underlying EI may reveal that individuals differ in how they 
engage in mechanisms responsible for emotionally intelligent performance. 
Mayer and Salovey’s assumption of entirely conscious emotional experience raises 
concerns in terms of how EI is measured, in that conscious processes may not be the only 
component responsible for emotionally intelligent performance. Most items of the MSCEIT 
represent performance in hypothetical situations, not actual performance. For example, 
emotionally intelligent individuals are those who are able to identify the best strategy to cope 
with a situation characterized by high emotional involvement. Yet, some individuals may be 
good at mindfully thinking and describing how they or a generic person should behave in 
hypothetical situations, but not as good at actually performing the behavior. 
The distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1985) may 
clarify this point. Declarative knowledge refers to representation of facts, rules, and 
procedures necessary to perform a task successfully. It is also called the knowing what of a 
task because it is related to general principals of functioning. In contrast, procedural 
knowledge represents the skill to use declarative knowledge in actual performance. It is 
called the knowing how because it is related to practical execution of a task. The top-down 
approach in cognitive literature (Sun, Peterson, & Merrill, 1996) emphasizes that practice 
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strengthens the relationship between declarative and procedural knowledge. First, individuals 
acquire explicit knowledge of how to do something, and then, with practice, they learn how 
to use it in procedural skills. Thus, in early stages of skill acquisition, individuals may know 
the rules for executing a task without being good executors. With respect to EI, this means 
that individuals scoring high on the MSCEIT may not show emotionally intelligent behavior 
in real emotionally salient situations, because they may have declarative knowledge about 
emotions, which helps to score high on the test, but lack the procedural skill necessary to use 
emotions successfully in actual behavior. 
In addition, research also supports another alternative: Individuals may be good at 
performing a task, but not at describing how they perform it (Sun, Merrill, & Peterson, 2001).  
In fact, once a skill becomes highly proceduralized, it can be performed without having much 
support of declarative knowledge. For instance, individuals may be able to ‘automatically’ 
perform a task despite not consciously relying on the steps needed to do it. According to this 
possibility, individuals scoring low on the MSCEIT may show high EI in interpersonal 
encounters. In fact, individuals may lack declarative knowledge responsible for high scores 
on the MSCEIT, but have highly proceduralized skills responsible for emotionally intelligent 
behavior in real situations.1 Either possibility points to the importance of considering 
automatic processes – processes that strongly rely on procedural knowledge – as an 
additional source of individual differences in emotionally intelligent behavior beyond 
conscious processes. 
Mayer and Salovey's theorization raises concerns not only in terms of how EI is 
measured, but also of how it is conceptualized. In fact, the authors rely on the assumption that 
emotional experience pertains to the domain of consciousness. They did not address the point 
that a automatic component might be involved in EI, nor did they mention any automatic 
processing underlying EI. Indeed, the test they introduced to measure EI – the MSCEIT – is 
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strongly based on conscious processing: Items require subjects to recognize emotions 
conveyed through pictures, identify emotions matching a certain situation, choose which 
emotion best describes how a person would feel in a certain situation, and identify the 
strategy that would best work to cope with an emotionally demanding situation. Although 
automatic processes may contribute to some extent to the choice of the correct answer (see 
Jacoby, 1991), the assumption underlying such items is that individuals are aware of their 
emotional experience, they intentionally use emotions to facilitate thought, they mindfully 
understand what they or other people are feeling, and are able to regulate emotions 
consciously – even though in different degrees. Indeed, to find the correct answer individuals 
need to be engaged in thoughtful reasoning about their own and others’ emotions.  
However, recently, one of the most salient issues in emotion research has been the 
relationship between emotion and the unconscious (see, for example, Feldman Barrett, 
Niedenthal, & Winkielman, 2005). Despite the fact that the role of automatic processes has 
not been clarified thus far, it seems unquestionable that there is an automatic component in 
emotional experience: Research supports that automatic affective reactions may influence 
preferences and behavior (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). Similarly, in social cognition 
literature a vast array of studies emphasizes automaticity in attitudes and behavior (e.g., 
Bargh, 2007): Processes we are not aware of profoundly influence judgments about ourselves 
and other people. The issue has not been approached with respect to EI yet, even though it 
may clarify debated issues, such as the theoretical definition and the validity of the construct. 
The acknowledgment of a potential automaticity component of EI has been brought 
up by Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts (2003, p. 71), who observed that “...much emotional 
behavior, ranging from facial expression to responding to nonverbal social cues, appears to 
be implicit.” Although they touched on the point of automatic processing of emotional 
information, Zeidner, Matthews, and Roberts have not followed up this claim with any 
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further elaboration in relation to EI.  
The analysis of conscious and automatic processes involved in EI might clarify what 
outcomes EI predicts. In fact, current theorization might be missing variability in emotionally 
intelligent behavior due to automatic processes that have not been considered thus far. Thus, 
it appears appropriate to incorporate the debate about automatic emotional experience and to 
inquire about the role automaticity might play in EI theorization and research. I address this 
issue in the following section. 
Evidence Supporting The Effect Of Automatic Processing In Emotional Experience 
The purpose of the literature review is twofold: First, by relating the construct of EI to 
the core mechanisms of emotional processing, I aim to shift the debate from the mere 
description of what is EI to the explanation of what processes might constitute EI, including 
automatic processes. Second, consistent with the perspective of those who encourage the 
integration of individual differences with the analysis of emotion processes (e.g. Gohm & 
Clore, 2000; Seo & Barrett, 2007; Underwood, 1975), I intend to show that the construct of 
EI may be best understood considering how individuals differ in processing emotion 
information.  
Studies are surveyed from emotion and social cognition literature and have been 
conducted with an experimental approach, i.e., manipulating variables and comparing effects 
between experimental conditions. At the end of each subsection I discuss how an individual 
difference perspective may complement this approach. Specifically, I analyze how variables 
might differ not only between conditions, but also within, depending on individual 
differences in EI.  
The distinction between conscious and automatic processes is controversial. Some 
authors claim that these processes should be considered as extremes of a continuum, others 
two different ways to process information (see Psychological Inquiry, 2006, Volume 17, 
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Issue 3). Because evidence indicates a different brain localization for conscious and 
automatic processing (e.g., Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998) and research seems to move 
toward considering differences in processing as “a core-processing distinction in the study of 
social cognitive neuroscience” (Lieberman, 2007, p. 276), herein I embrace the latter 
position: the term ‘conscious’ is used to indicate qualitatively different processes than 
‘automatic.’  
Research has been included in the literature review according to a conception of 
automaticity for which any of these conditions suffice to characterize a process as automatic 
(Bargh, 1994): The process is not accessible to awareness; the process is not intentional, or 
individuals do not recognize it as the cause of their action/state; the process is not controlled, 
or individuals are not able to stop it once it started; the process is efficient and operates under 
low cognitive resources. 
Surveyed studies are arranged in subsections reflecting the four components of EI 
model. This organization is chosen to facilitate the illustration of the main argument, namely 
that automatic processing may account for emotionally intelligent behavior, and it does not 
imply that each of the four subability of the model is distinctively associated with specific 
automatic processes.  
Automatic Processing in Perceiving Emotions 
A consistent body of research supports the idea that individuals may perceive a 
stimulus without awareness of perception (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). Perception 
of emotional expressions is a fundamental skill for daily life:  A person who realizes that her 
boss is disappointed in her work, rather than pleased, may plan a more efficacious course of 
action. After all, accurately detecting emotional signals has increased the chances of survival 
throughout human evolution.  
 Murphy and Zajonc (1993) conducted one of the seminal works analyzing the effect of 
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subliminal affective priming on information processing. In a series of experiments, they 
compared the effects of two categories of priming stimuli (affective and cognitive), upon 
different exposure times (4 ms and 1000 ms) on liking rates, and judgments of objective 
characteristics of stimuli. More specifically, in one experiment, researchers primed 
participants either subliminally or supraliminally with angry and happy face; then they 
showed an ambiguous stimulus (Chinese ideographs) for 2 seconds, asking participants to 
rate how much they would like it.  Results showed that the effect of priming was related to 
the length of exposure: In the subliminal condition, subjects exposed to priming of happy 
faces liked the target more than subjects exposed to angry faces; in the supraliminal 
condition, differences in liking rates after happy and angry face priming were not significant. 
Interestingly, when the judgment of the target referred to objective characteristics, such as its 
shape instead of liking rates, and subjects were primed with cognitive stimuli (circles, 
squares) rather than affective ones, the pattern of results was exactly the opposite: 
Participants’ judgments were influenced only by the supraliminal prime. Overall, results 
suggest that affective evaluation may occur very fast and without awareness, whereas 
cognitive evaluation requires more conscious processing.  
Along the same lines, Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger (2005) hypothesized that 
subliminal presentation of angry versus happy faces would influence subsequent beverage 
consumption (study 1), and willingness to pay for the beverage (study 2). In study 1, after 
rating their level of thirst and hunger, subjects were subliminally primed with angry, happy, 
or neutral faces (exposure time 16 ms). Participants were then asked to indicate the gender of 
a visible target (exposure time 400 ms). Afterwards, subjects rated their current mood and 
arousal, and performed a drinking task in which they poured and consumed as much fruity 
beverage as they wanted.  
Results showed that thirsty participants exposed to happy faces drank and poured 
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more beverage than participants exposed to angry faces. The effect disappeared when 
participants were not thirsty, revealing an interaction of affective and motivational factors, 
suggesting that automatic affective reactions may influence behavior under certain incentive 
conditions. Results were replicated in the second experiment in which subliminal priming of 
happy faces not only influenced participants’ drinking behavior, but also their willingness to 
pay more for it. 
Liddell, Williams, Rathjen, Shevrin, and Gordon (2004) investigated the effect of 
subliminal and supraliminal priming on emotional perception by analyzing event-related 
brain potentials (ERP). Faces with fearful and neutral expressions were presented either 
subliminally, with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, the interval between the onset of the 
target stimulus and the onset of the masking stimulus) of 10 ms, or supraliminally, with a 
SOA of 170 ms, followed by a neutral masking stimulus. Ratings of emotion accuracy and 
intensity were collected after each stimulus presentation. Results showed that overall ERP 
responses were significantly larger and faster for fear expression, as opposed to neutral 
expression. Furthermore, the pattern of activation was different between supraliminal and 
subliminal exposure: Subliminal priming activated faster ERP reactions, indicating more 
rapid processing. Also, localization of responses was different in the two priming conditions, 
supporting the idea that processing of visual information may follow different pathways than 
conscious perception, a finding confirmed by other studies (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). 
Finally, only supraliminal stimuli were consciously detected by subjects, as indicated by a 
post-test emotion identification task in which most participants correctly identified 
expressions of the target only in the 170 ms SOA condition.  
 In summary, research shows that individuals may perceive emotional cues even when 
stimuli are shown under the threshold of conscious perception. Furthermore, subliminal 
perception of emotional stimuli may affect cognition and behavior without conscious 
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awareness from the perceiver. Although much research has been conducted to show the 
pervasive characteristics and effects of subliminal perception, less has been done to show that 
individuals may differ with respect to how they respond to emotional cues subliminally 
presented. In fact, in reviewed studies researchers manipulated a stimulus to analyze effects 
on further information processing or behavior averaging data across all subjects within each 
experimental condition. In general, this is a good strategy when individuals are supposed to 
react in the same way to stimuli; however, when individuals differ, averaging may be 
misleading. A more accurate analysis may be conducted by introducing an individual 
difference variable. In particular, one of the components of EI is emotional perception, 
defined as the ability accounting for how people vary in their accuracy in perceiving 
emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). High emotionally intelligent individuals might be more 
accurate than low emotionally intelligent ones to identify emotional stimuli subliminally 
presented because of their sensitivity to emotional cues.  
Support to this claim comes from Matsumoto and colleagues (Matsumoto et el. 2000), 
who found stable individual differences in people’s ability to accurately detect briefly 
displayed emotional expressions. The authors used the masking paradigm employed in many 
studies involving subliminal perception, with 56 pictures representing facial expressions of 
the basic emotions displayed for 200 ms and followed by the same person’s neutral 
expression lasting 1 sec. Scores were collected according to the correct number of guessing 
of the emotion displayed. Importantly, the authors found that individuals who were more 
accurate in recognizing emotional expressions were also more socially effective. In 
particular, international students studying in the US who were good at detecting expressions 
of anger, disgust, and surprise in others were better at adjusting to the new social 
environment (Yoo, Matsumoto, & LeRoux, 2006).  
Correct recognition of emotions, especially negative ones, may be a strong advantage 
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for guiding interpersonal relationships. Still, sometimes facial expressions may appear for as 
little as a fraction of a second, as it happens for microexpressions; hence, only those who are 
particularly responsive to emotions, or high EI individuals, can notice them and adjust their 
behavior to this perception, resulting in more efficacious social relations. High EI individuals 
are characterized by social effectiveness (http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/). Fast 
recognition of emotion cues might be the automatic process underlying this characteristic.  
Automatic Processing in Using Emotion to Facilitate Thought 
 Research shows that mood influences the way individuals process information and 
make decisions: when in a good mood individuals are inclined to judge the target more 
positively than when in a bad mood. These mood congruency effects, consisting of judgments 
biased toward the current mood state, have been explained by the fact that emotional 
information activates thoughts in memory with the same affective valence (Bower, 1991; 
Isen, 1987).  
 Schwarz and Clore (1983) provide an explanation of mood congruency effects that does 
not involve memory processes. According to the mood-as-information theory, current mood 
is considered a source of information for the judgment at hand: Individuals rely on how they 
feel about the situation/target for making a decision, even when the feeling depends on 
unrelated factors. In fact, generally individuals are not able to distinguish between incidental 
feelings and feelings elicited by the target, drawing mistaken conclusions about it. When 
individuals question the relationship between their feeling and the object of judgment, mood 
congruency effects may disappear. Of note, according to this theory feelings do not always 
bias decision-making; they may serve as an accurate source of information when feelings are 
in fact attributable to the target, such as when they provide signals regarding the most optimal 
choice (Damasio, 1994). Yet, how do people realize when it is the case to trust feelings? The 
answer to this question lies at the core of EI. One way through which individuals may 
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distinguish when an emotional reaction is incidental – and therefore misleading – from when 
it provides information on the current situation may be related to questioning the source of 
emotional reactions and becoming aware of the possible effects of emotion on behavior. 
When participants realized the potential influence of primes on an impression formation task, 
contrast instead of assimilation effects were observed (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1989; 
Newman & Uleman, 1990). Similarly, high EI individuals might be more skilled at using 
affective responses only when they matter. One way to test this hypothesis would be by 
comparing the effect of emotion priming on behavior in high and low EI individuals. In 
consideration of the fact that angry individuals tend to be more punitive in judging unrelated 
targets (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999) one could induce a certain emotion, such as 
anger, and observe its effect on an impression formation task. High EI individuals would be 
expected to show evaluation less biased by anger than low EI ones when the target of 
evaluation is not related to the object of anger. 
 When feelings are not incidental and arise as an appropriate reaction to the current 
situation, individuals obtain better outcomes if they are able to attend to what they are feeling 
and integrate emotional experience into their decision process. In an investment simulation, 
Seo and Barrett (2007) found that investors who were better at describing and differentiating 
feelings related to the situation obtained better investment outcomes. In this specific case, 
affective experience was analyzed at the level of conscious description of feelings and their 
association to the task at hand, but other findings support that individuals may rely on 
feelings without having accessible introspection to their effect during the decision-making 
process.  
 For instance, Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1991) is based on the 
assumption that decisions are guided by somatic sensations signaling the goodness of 
different options and directing attentional resources to the choice that is more promising. 
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Somatic markers may operate at an overt level, such as when individuals realize of their body 
changes and emotional reactions associated to the choice, or at a nonconscious level, such as 
when individuals are not aware of their body activity. According to Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall, and Zhang (2007) somatic markers represent the automatic affective response to the 
learned experience of having done something right or wrong; thus, in the authors’ view, 
affective responses promote adaptive behavior through facilitation of learning.  
 Using a gambling task in which participants have to chose cards from four decks, two 
of which are more advantageous than the others, Carter and Smith Pasqualini (2004) found 
that individual differences in skin conductance responses before the disadvantageous choice 
predicted higher money gain. Individuals who performed worse tended to produce less 
intense markers. The authors did not measure EI, but it might have influenced results. High 
EI individuals might have stronger autonomic responses, not necessarily perceived at a 
conscious level of awareness, which guide their behavior. Such sensitivity to visceral 
sensation may represent a strong advantage for guiding behavior toward the most profitable 
choice, an advantage that individuals may possess to varying degrees. 
 In summary, much research emphasizes the effect of mood on cognition and behavior. 
The introduction of an individual difference variable may complement results. In fact, what is 
supposed to be a generalized effect of mood on performance might exert different effects in 
high versus low EI individuals. In particular, high EI individuals might be characterized by a 
more profitable use of mood/emotion as a source of information by either discounting its 
effect when the feeling is incidental, or integrating it within the decision process when the 
feeling is contextual. Subgroups of high and low EI individuals may be compared with 
respect to processes accounting for how emotion information is integrated into decision 
processes, for example by using physiological detectors as well as inducing emotion and 
observing its effect on behavior. 
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Automatic Processing in Understanding Emotion 
People differ in the way they understand emotions. Some of them parse their 
emotional experience simply as pleasant or unpleasant, whereas others are able to 
differentiate nuances of feeling (Feldman, 1995). Although conscious processing is likely to 
play a major role in people’s ability to understand their own and other people’s emotion 
because interpretation of behavior highly relies on deliberate thinking, studies demonstrate 
that individuals may also understand emotions effortlessly and without conscious awareness. 
For instance, the literature on the chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) shows that 
automatic perception of other people’s gesture or behavior leads to imitation by the perceiver. 
Based on the same principle, studies conducted on mood contagion show that individuals 
unintentionally express emotion consciously and nonconsciously perceived in others 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson 1994). Individuals exposed to facial expressions react by 
spontaneously moving facial muscles (Dimberg, 1997): A happy face evokes zygomatic 
major muscle activity, related to the lips’ movement to produce a smile, whereas a sad face 
evokes corrugator surecilii muscle activity, related to eyebrow motion indicating disapproval 
(Dimber & Thunberg, 1998).  Dimberg, Thunberg, and Elmehed (2000) investigated whether 
perception of a facial stimulus presented outside of conscious awareness elicited emotional 
facial expression. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 30 ms 
presentation of happy, neutral or angry faces as the target stimulus, followed by 5 s 
presentation of neutral faces as the masking stimulus. A previous pilot test had shown that 30 
ms stimulus presentation was not accessible to conscious perception. Facial EMG of 
zygomatic major and corrugator supercilii activity was recorded. As expected, subjects 
exposed to the happy-neutral combination showed higher zygomatic major activity than the 
neutral-neutral or angry-neutral combinations. Furthermore, subjects exposed to the angry-
neutral combination showed higher corrugator supercilii activity than neutral-neutral and 
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happy-neutral combination. Overall, results confirmed that despite the conscious exposure to 
the same neutral stimulus, subjects showed more sensitivity to emotional facial expression 
displayed outside of conscious awareness. 
Findings suggest that perceivers may not simply mimic expressions, but they also 
understand others’ feeling, and experience the same emotion. For example, a study conducted 
by Neumann and Strack (2000) investigated whether imitating other people’s emotional 
behavior led to experiencing the same emotion with no awareness of emotional contagion. 
More specifically, students took part in a laboratory session presented as an experiment on 
oral comprehension (Neumann & Strack, 2000; experiment 1). Subjects listened to 5-min 
philosophical text presentation and subsequently answered questions about their current 
mood and the content of the presentation. The oral presentation was manipulated so that the 
tone of the speaker was neutral, slightly sad, or slightly happy.  Subjects were told to pay 
attention to the content of the presentation, to avoid their consciously noticing the emotional 
tone. Results showed a significant effect of mood manipulation on participants’ mood ratings; 
simple contrasts revealed that after listening to the presentation, individuals exposed to the 
slightly happy tone condition reported higher ratings for happiness, as opposed to those 
exposed to the slightly sad and neutral condition. The fact that individuals reported feeling 
the same emotion the target was feeling suggests that they detected/understood other people’s 
feeling. Thus, a possibility is that mimicry is the result of one’s understanding of emotional 
messages. Another possibility is that mimicry arises from automatic imitation of someone 
else’s expression, which induces an emotional reaction through the feedback elicited by facial 
muscles (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). In the latter case, individual differences in the 
ability to understand emotions would be caused by mimicry-related facial feedback, which, in 
turn, results in understanding others’ emotions.2 Both explanations emphasize the importance 
of mimicry as an automatic process underlying the ability to understand other people’s 
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emotions.  
Emotion understanding has been said to involve “the comprehension of the meaning 
of emotions, coupled with the capacity to reason about those meanings” 
(www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence). Empathy, defined as the ability to recognize and feel 
what another person is feeling,  was found to correlate with branch 3, understanding emotion 
(Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990), thus reflecting an 
aspect of EI (Mayer and Salovey, 1990). An individual differences study compared high and 
low empathic individuals with respect to mimicry reactions (Sonnby-Borgström, Jönsson, & 
Svensson, 2003). Angry and happy faces were presented at different exposure times: 17 ms, 
56 ms, 2350 ms, with constant presentation order. The researchers varied exposure time to 
investigate the effect of different levels of conscious perception on mimicry. In a within-
subject design, subjects looked at angry and happy faces, which were displayed 10 times at 
each exposure time. A masking picture was also shown for 63 ms after the target face, as a 
distractor. Level of empathy was measured using the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional 
Empathy (QMEE, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). The dependent variable was facial muscle 
activity, particularly the zygomaticus major, indicating smiling reaction, and the corrugator 
supercilii, indicating furrowed brow, recorded with electromyography (EMG). Mimicking 
reactions were defined as the correspondence between exposure to angry face and activity of 
the corrugator supercilii, and exposure to happy face and activity of the zygomaticus major.  
At 17 ms exposure time results showed no mimicking behavior. At 56 ms, an 
ANOVA combining affective stimulus by empathy level revealed that, after being exposed to 
an angry face, high empathy individuals reacted with more corrugator supercilii activity than 
low empathy individuals; similarly, after being exposed to a happy face, high empathy 
individuals reported higher zygomaticus major activity than low empathy individuals. At 
2350 ms exposure time, there was no interaction effect and a main effect was found only for 
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the corrugator. Although results of this study need to be carefully considered because of 
limitations regarding the design of the experiment – particularly lack of control for anxiety as 
a possible confound in detecting threatening stimuli – they suggest that individuals may differ 
in the way they react to emotional stimuli, and that their reaction may occur at an automatic 
level of processing. Assuming that emotionally intelligent individuals are also empathic 
persons, this study suggests that high EI individuals might more frequently mimic other 
people’s behavior as a spontaneous indication of understanding others’ emotions.  
A way to make sense of how mimicry as an indicator of automatic understanding of 
others’ emotions may be related to EI is by considering the social advantage of imitating 
others’ behavior. Automatic mimicry as been proposed to function as “social glue” 
(Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aart, 2007) in consideration of several studies demonstrating 
correlations between rapport/liking and mimicry of behavior. The fact that automatic mimicry 
may endorse affiliation is well demonstrated by Lakin and Chartrand (2003). In the first 
experiment the authors tested whether conscious and automatic affiliation goals led 
participants to mimic the target of affiliation. Participants were exposed to one of three 
experimental conditions: subliminal priming with affiliation words, such as ’friend’ 
(automatic-affiliation goal condition); explicit indication that they would lately interact with a 
person to perform a task together (conscious affiliation goal condition); no goal indication 
(control condition). Soon after, participants observed the behavior of a confederate with the 
instruction to memorize her behavior. The confederate acted by touching her face several 
times; subjects were analyzed for how long they touched their face when watching the target. 
Participants in the two goal conditions – automatic and conscious – mimicked more than no 
goal condition, supporting the hypothesis that individuals use automatic strategies to pursuing 
their goal of which they may not be aware.  
Importantly, in the second experiment the authors demonstrated that automatic 
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strategies may help individuals to succeed in their goal to be liked more by others: 
Participants automatically primed with an affiliation goal were liked more by a confederate 
(blind to the study) as a function of mimicking. The amount of mimicking was higher when 
participants had failed in a previous attempt to establish good interpersonal relationships, 
demonstrating that mimicking was used as an automatic strategy to create affiliation.  
Better social relations characterize high EI individuals (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 
2007). Automatic mimicry might be the mechanism underlying individual differences in EI: 
high EI individuals might show more mimic, which in turn generate better social perception 
and better interpersonal relationships.  
Automatic Processing in Managing Emotion 
 Managing emotion refers to the way individuals regulate emotions. Most of the time 
emotion regulation strategies help to maintain or induce positive affective states, and to avoid 
or reduce negative ones (for a review see Erber & Erber, 2001). However, depending on the 
adaptive function of emotion, regulation strategies may also serve a different purpose. For 
instance, individuals may delay immediate gratification when they think they can gain better 
advantages later on (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).  
 Since the pioneering work of Sigmund Freud (Freud, 1930/1961) on repression as a 
regulatory mechanism to suppress intolerable thoughts or memories, research has started to 
explore the role automatic processes play in emotion regulation (e.g., Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 
2007). In addition, research supports the idea that repressors, defined as individuals showing 
discrepancy between levels of anxiety at the physiological and behavioral level (high) and at 
the self-descriptive level (low), are not aware of their reaction in stressful situations 
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 1999) and that the effect of such a discrepancy may be costly in the 
long term, causing negative health outcomes such as exhaustion. Conversely, more recent 
studies raised the point that automatic emotion regulation may be an efficacious way to 
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manage emotions at no cost (e.g., Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). 
 In two experiments Mauss, Cook, and Gross (2007) showed that subjects primed with 
words referring to controlling emotion reported no maladaptive cardio-vascular responses 
(experiment 2), and lower experience of negative emotion (experiment 1) than subjects 
primed with words referring to expressing emotion. 
 In experiment 1, students were primed with either ‘control’ or ‘express’ emotion 
strategy with the Sentence Unscrambling Task (SUT, Srull & Wyer, 1979). This task requires 
subjects to form four-word sentences from a list of five disarranged words. About half of the 
sentences contained either a ‘control’ or an ‘express’ synonym (such us ‘impulsive’ or 
‘restrain’). After the prime procedure, which was meant to activate the corresponding 
emotion regulation strategy, participants completed a mood questionnaire and were then 
involved in an anger provocation situation characterized by a tedious task and interaction 
with a noxious experimenter. A mood questionnaire concluded the experimental session, 
together with the debriefing. None of the participants was aware of the priming manipulation.  
 Results demonstrated that the ‘control’ prime affected participants’ anger reaction, as 
demonstrated by subjects’ lower anger ratings in the ‘control’ versus ‘express’ condition 
following the anger provocation. This result supported the hypothesis that automatic priming 
influenced emotion regulation strategy.  
 To corroborate the finding that emotion regulation may be automatically induced, and 
to further explore the idea that the effects of regulation are cost free in terms of physiological 
reactions – not only subjective reports – Mauss, Cook, and Gross (2007) conducted a second 
experiment. The procedure was similar to experiment 1, but an initial anger provocation was 
added to identify the baseline arousal of each participant, together with recording of 
physiological reactions. Results showed no differences in anger activation before priming; 
after priming, the group exposed to the ‘control’ condition reported less negative experience 
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of anger than the ‘express’ group, confirming previous results. But, no significant effect of 
priming on physiological response was observed. This result, on the one hand confirms that 
automatic regulation was done at no cost; on the other hand, it poses some concerns about the 
effect of the priming manipulation, in that one might have expected lower cardiovascular 
responses in the ‘control’ condition, compared to ‘express’ condition, rather than no effect at 
all.  
Support for the idea that emotion regulation may rely on automatic processing comes 
also from individual differences studies. According to Koole and Jostmann (2004) two 
different styles of self-regulation may occur when people deal with emotional response: state 
orientation, which maintains the status quo by passively enduring the emotional state, and 
action orientation, which actively regulates affective states. Individuals high in action 
orientation are supposed to be skilled in intuitive affect regulation, which refers to an 
automatic form of affect regulation activated only in potentially stressful situations with the 
purpose of improving mood. To assess the effect of intuitive affect regulation, Koole and 
Jostman used the paradigm of the face in the crowd (Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001), in 
which participants, after filling out a questionnaire designed to identify their action or state 
orientation, were asked to identify a single discrepant face among a crowd of identical ones. 
Action-and state-oriented individuals were first engaged in a visualization task in which they 
had to recall either a demanding or accepting person from their past experience (Koole & 
Jostmann, 2004; experiment 3). Then, they were exposed to 3 x 3 matrices of either identical 
faces (happy, neutral, or angry), or 8 identical and one discrepant face (happy, neutral, or 
angry).  They had to press a different button when the faces were all the same, or one was 
discrepant.  
In performing this task, individuals are generally faster to indicate when an angry 
discrepant face is present, due to higher receptivity to threatening stimuli (Ohman, Lundqvist, 
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& Esteves, 2001). This effect was found in both state- and action-oriented subjects; 
additionally, and as expected, the researchers found that action-oriented individuals were 
quicker to detect happy faces in a crowd of angry ones after visualization of a demanding 
person, but not after visualization of an accepting person. State-oriented individuals displayed 
no difference in the two visualization conditions. This finding demonstrates that action-
oriented individuals, presumably relying on intuitive affect regulation, were more efficient to 
switch from negative to positive affect – indicated by quicker detection of a happy face in a 
crowd of angry ones – as a strategy to mitigate negative emotions.  
 Moon and Lord (2006) investigated the effect of individual differences in fast and slow 
emotion regulation processes on task performance. They tested the hypothesis that fast 
emotion regulation processes (FERPs), but not slow emotion regulation processes (SERPs), 
predict performance on a task characterized by emotional involvement; furthermore, 
individual differences in FERPS were expected to predict performance beyond intelligence 
and self-report measures of emotions. The assumption underlying 3 studies Moon and Lord 
conducted was that FERPs work by inhibiting or suppressing inappropriate emotions when 
individuals cannot spend much effort on the task at hand; for this reason, individuals highly 
skilled in FERPs were expected to perform better in tasks characterized by need for fast or 
automatic emotion regulation. The first study and the other two follow-ups were based on the 
same procedure, which was meant to measure individual differences in FERPs : Participants 
watched for 150 ms two stimuli presented on the screen conveying opposite emotions (i.e., a 
happy and a sad face); they were instructed to pay attention to one (the target) and ignore the 
other (the distractor). Afterwards, a lexical decision task required participants to indicate 
whether a word was meaningful or not; the word was either consistent (e.g., the word sad 
after a sad face) with the target, consistent with the distractor, or unrelated to both (control 
condition). Participants’ reaction times (RT) to the lexical task, in particular time taken to 
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process the distractor-congruent words, were considered indicative of effectiveness of 
suppression mechanisms; individual differences in RT were also considered. The criterion 
measure was performance on two tasks requiring fast emotion regulation: a scrambled 
sentence task, in which participants were instructed to correct spelling errors without paying 
attention to the content of the text and an editing task, in which participants had to form any 
sentence using only emotionally negative words. To investigate the effect of emotion 
suppression in fast and slow emotion regulation processes, researchers manipulated the SOA 
between the two tasks, using intervals of 350 ms (supposed to activate FERPs), and 2000 ms 
(supposed to activate SERPs). Both tasks were characterized by high emotional content – 
which could in principle interfere with performance, if not controlled, because subtracting 
attention from the main task – and time pressure.  
 Results showed that performance was predicted by individual differences in RTs to the 
distractor-congruent word in the lexical task, indicating an effective suppression mechanism. 
Furthermore, and as expected, results were significant in the 350 ms SOA condition, i.e. at a 
subliminal level, but not in the 2000 ms condition, demonstrating that suppression of 
inappropriate emotions was effective only during fast emotion regulation processes. Finally, 
in line with hypotheses, individual differences in the ability to suppress emotions during 
FERPs predicted performance after controlling for conscientiousness and verbal intelligence.  
 Most of the literature on emotion regulation focuses on intentional strategies 
individuals use to influence their emotional state. Although effortful strategies play a relevant 
role in emotion regulation, studies I have presented demonstrate that emotions may be 
regulated automatically. Introducing EI as an individual difference construct, findings 
suggest that high emotionally intelligent individuals might be more efficacious than low 
emotionally intelligent individuals at automatically regulating emotions for better outcomes 
and to pursue their self-regulatory goals.  
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 For instance, in a similar vein to Koole and Jostman’s research (2004) Chartrand, 
Dalton, and Cheng (2005) found that participants who failed at automatic goal pursuit (that 
is, at successfully resolving an anagram task when they were told to do their best) were more 
likely to engage in self-enhancement to maintain self-esteem as an implicit strategy to correct 
for negative emotion generated by failure.  EI was not measured in this experiment, but there 
might be differences in the level by which individuals engage in automatic self-enhancement. 
High EI individuals tend to have higher self-esteem (Brackett et al. 2006).  Automatic self-
enhancement might be the mechanisms through which some individuals, high EI ones, 
preserve high self-esteem.  
Reconceptualizing EI within a Process-Oriented Approach 
A look at the emotion and social cognition literature has revealed that the conception 
of EI as composed of a set of abilities to deal with emotion based solely on reflective 
mechanisms appears too restrictive: Affective reactions are processed instantaneously and 
may influence behavior with no or little involvement of conscious thinking.  
Furthermore, considerations on the mechanisms involved in emotional processing 
have raised the possibility that individuals may differ with respect to how they engage in 
emotional processing. Research on the perception-behavior link (Bargh 1990; Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999) emphasizes the ubiquitous effect of automatic activation of concepts on 
congruent behavior: Participants subtly primed with word referred to rudeness were more 
likely to behave rudely (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).   
EI and the underlying core mechanisms of emotional processing may be conceived as 
of the factor(s) intervening between perception and behavior when the stimulus to be 
perceived is emotional or has hedonic valence (Figure 1). The assumption is that perception 
of emotional stimuli does not exert the same behavior in all individuals: Some people may 
behave less rudely than others after being primed with rudeness because they integrate 
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emotion with thought and action in a more profitable way, so as to make their behavior more 
effective with respect to the context. These are high emotionally intelligent individuals. 
According to this conceptualization, understanding individual differences in EI 
implies analyzing the steps involved in emotional processing: they include reacting to a 
stimulus as the first affective response; paying attention to physiological reactions activated 
by the stimulus and integrating them with current judgment; and understanding the effect of 
an affective reaction on behavior and regulating its magnitude by either intensifying, 
lessening, or maintaining it. The steps involved in emotion information processing, which by 
and large map into the four branches identified in Mayer and Salovey’s model, may occur 
with no particular order during an emotional episode and are thought of as basic phases of 
emotional processing common to all individuals (Gahm & Clore, 2000). Still, “for any 
psychological mechanism or process proposed by a theory, there may exist individual 
differences in the tendency or ability to engage this mechanism or process” (Gohm & Clore, 
2000, p. 682).  Individuals may be more or less sensitive to emotional cues, they may differ 
with respect to the ability to discriminate feelings and integrate them as a source of 
information for judgment, and they may vary in their ability to regulate emotional reactions. 
In addition, because each step of emotional processing may be executed consciously and 
automatically, individuals may differ with respect to how they engage in each type of 
processing. 
A Dual-Process Framework 
According to dual-process models (e.g., Devine, 1989; Smith & DeCoster, 2000), 
behavioral and emotional responses depend on the interplay between conscious and 
automatic processing.  Specifically, event perception elicits information processing 
characterized by low cognitive effort, and no conscious awareness; automatic processing is 
accompanied or followed by conscious processing, which may adjust the initial perception by 
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means of cognitive resources. The framework of dual-process models may be used to 
describe EI in that both conscious and automatic processes characterize emotion processing 
and contribute to successful emotion-based performance. In this section I explore how.  
Automatic processing has evolved as a highly adaptive function. Without it 
individuals would not be able to handle the large amount of information that needs to be 
processed for executing daily activities. Automatic processing may sometimes result in 
undesirable effects. The literature on stereotypes well documents the risks of relying heavily 
on automatic processing. At the same time, individuals who are able to manage emotional 
reactions effortlessly and with no need for conscious attention have an advantage compared 
to individuals who do not, because they end up having additional resources at disposition that 
may be useful for other purposes. 
So far I have used automatic as an umbrella term indicating processes underlying 
automaticity that posses different characteristics. Automaticity has been defined as 
uncontrollable, unintentional, efficient, and occurring outside of awareness. These features 
hardly occur in an all-or-none fashion, being the most common scenario the one in which a 
process may possess some features of conscious and some of automatic processing (Bargh, 
1994). Because automaticity is not a unitary concept (Evans, 2008; Moors & De Houwer 
2006) and its feaures are conceptually distinct, considerations about its occurrence may 
change according to the specific features analyzed. 
Hence, to understand the role of automatic processes in EI it becomes important to 
focus the attention on one feature only. The characteristic of automaticity I believe is most 
relevant to EI is awareness. Processes occurring below awareness are also known as 
‘unconscious’ (Moors & De Houwer, 2006) and from now onward I will use this term 
accordingly. Unconscious may refer to different aspects of emotion as individuals may be 
(un)aware of:  a) the causes of emotion, that is, of emotional cue in the environment that 
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elicited the emotional reaction; b) the content of emotion, that is, the emotion they felt (anger, 
happiness, contempt etc.); c) the effect or consequences of emotional reaction on cognition 
and behavior. Each aspect of awareness involves different unconscious processes, and as 
such, requires a different paradigm of investigation.  
Awareness of the causes of emotion is concerned with studying processes of emotion 
perception that may not require consciousness to elicit emotion processing. These processes 
may be investigated with the subliminal perception paradigm, that is, varying stimulus’ 
presentation time in a way that allows for observing how individuals differ in accuracy of 
perception and its effect on behavior when the stimulus is presented under the threshold of 
conscious perception. Awareness of the causes of emotion involves also the analysis of 
processes of allocation of attention. Theories of selective attention (Broadbent, 1958) point 
out that individuals possess attentional mechanisms that focus on some information in the 
environment instead of others. Allocation of attentional resources to emotional stimuli 
triggers emotion processing that eventually affects cognition and behavior. Still, individuals 
who do not respond to emotional cues do not start emotion processing in the first place. Thus, 
exploring differences in allocation of attention to emotional stimuli may reveal the origin of 
individual differences in EI.  
Awareness of the content of emotion concerns the study of processes of 
differentiation of affective reactions and integration of body sensation into information 
processing. Individuals who are better at detecting body changes experience feelings more 
intensely (Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000). Introspective sensitivity to body changes 
was found to be related to better detection of subliminal emotional stimuli and better 
anticipation of electric shocks (Katkin, Wiens, & Öhman, 2001).  Furthermore, the ability to 
discriminate emotions was associated with several positive outcomes, such as successful 
emotion regulation and better decision-making (Barrett & Gross, 2001; Seo & Barrett, 2007). 
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High EI individuals, as measured by the MSCEIT, were better at heartbeat detection 
(Schneider, Lyons, & Williams, 2005). Collectively, this line of research highlights that 
awareness of emotional reactions is an important requirement for using emotion 
appropriately. Yet, individuals may not be aware of what they are feeling; of note, this fact 
does not compromise the effect of emotion on behavior.  
Awareness of the effect of emotions is concerned with studying accessibility of beliefs 
about emotion and the effect of such beliefs on behavior. Knowledge of the effect of emotion 
remains largely inaccessible to individuals (Cleeremans, 2004) and may be at the origin of 
biased behavior. Individuals formulate beliefs about the causes and effects of emotion that 
eventually are used to explain their own and others’ behavior in the form of lay theories. As 
demonstrated in the seminal work by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), these naïve explanations 
may be very little or not at all related to the real determinants of conduct. Instead, having a 
more accurate representation of emotions and, in particular, of the possible effects of emotion 
on behavior may prevent unwanted effects and foster better adjustment to the context. 
Realizing that primes may influence impression formation, participants reacted with contrast 
instead of assimilation effects (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh 1987; Newman & Uleman, 
1990). Furthermore, individual differences in implicit theories of emotion predicted better 
socio-emotional adjustment (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007); in particular, students 
who believed that emotions were malleable had a better transition to college than students 
who believed them to be fixed and not subject to control. Knowledge of the causes and 
effects of emotion characterizes high EI individuals, as indicated in Mayer and Salovey’s 
theorization and findings (Mayer & Salovey, 1990).  
The first step for understanding automaticity in EI is identifying which aspect of the 
unconscious (cause, content, effect) is subject to investigation. The next is looking into the 
pathways through which a process may or may not be associated to awareness. The 
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assumption is that unconscious processes may be of different kinds and, importantly, they 
may be linked to emotionally intelligent behavior through different psychological 
mechanisms (Figure 2).  
Preconscious processes are characterized by a lack of awareness at a given time, but 
may become conscious when attention is directed to them (Baars, 1988), which means that 
these processes are potentially accessible. The hypothesis I made that high EI individuals 
may have higher sensitivity (or attention) to emotional cues implies that for these individuals 
preconscious emotion processes related to the cause, content, and effect of emotions on 
behavior may more easily enter awareness and become a source of information for decision-
making and accurate perception of others’ emotions.  According to that, high EI individuals 
are characterized by an awareness of emotional aspects that in common people are not 
accessible. Individual differences in preconscious processes underlying EI may be 
investigated with free verbal reports regarding situations in which individuals are encouraged 
to come up with explanations of the way emotions may influence behavior.3  
Of a different nature are processes that may not become aware even when attention is 
directed to them. An example of these processes, that herein I will call implicit processes, are 
mental processes, such as rapid affective appraisal leading to emotion or intuitive affect 
regulation processes as described by Koole and Jostman (2004), in which the input stimulus 
or the process may not reach the threshold of awareness because too fast to be perceived or 
because structurally inaccessible to awareness. Individual differences may emerge through 
experimental tasks that look at the occurrence of the process with indirect measures, that is, 
making inferences on the process on the basis of its effect on performance. Appropriate 
awareness checks (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) should be used to make sure that awareness 
was not implicated. 
Finally, another kind of unconscious processes regards skill-based or learning-based 
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processes that have also been labeled by some scholars as automatic (Logan, 1992) and that I 
will call automatized to differentiate them from the automatic processes with a generic 
connotation that I have used throughout the manuscript. Automatized processes develop with 
practice and involve changes in awareness as a function of automatization. They may start as 
preconscious processes. For instance, before I was talking about the importance of being 
aware of the effects of emotion on behavior as a way to prevent unwanted emotion contagion. 
Awareness of effects of emotion may be conceived of as a preconscious process that becomes 
accessible under certain conditions: The more you pay attention to emotional aspects, the 
more you are likely to use emotional information in your decision process. Still, knowledge 
of the effects of emotion, once inferred from instances and experienced through effortful and 
conscious processing, may become ‘automatized’ and guide behavior as an habitual response 
(Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). Habits, as a form of goal-directed automatic behavior, may be 
activated without conscious awareness (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000); this implies that the 
simple presence of emotional cues may be sufficient to activate the habitual response that, in 
high EI individuals, corresponds to highly adaptive behavior.  Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, 
and Zhang (2007) propose that consciously experienced emotions leave in memory the trace 
of the behavior associated to a certain situation; when a similar situation is encountered, the 
same emotion is automatically activated as a guide for behavior. Logan (1988) describes 
automatized performance according to a single-step memory retrieval account: Initially 
individuals perform a task going through a series of steps, or if-then rules, connecting the 
input to the production of the output. With practice, an association between the input and 
output is formed in memory so that once the input is perceived, the output automatically 
follows bypassing the intermediate steps. The fact that automatized performance results from 
direct association of input and output suggests that the intermediate steps may not be 
consciously accessible. Hence, methods based on conscious recalling of the steps executed 
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during performance, such as guided recall or ‘think aloud’ protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 
1998), may not reveal all the pathways leading to unconscious behavior; indirect measures 
based on speed of execution in which proof of automaticity is detected by rapidly performing 
emotion operations would be a good complementary solution.  
The distinction of different types of unconscious processes is fundamental to identify 
the source of individual differences in EI. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 2, it provides 
directions on which assessment methods, such as direct and/or indirect measures, 4  would be 
most appropriate to detect variability in emotionally intelligent performance. Notably, the 
various EI subabilities are likely to rely on more than one type of unconscious process, with 
each of them following a different route to automaticity.  
For instance, the source of automaticity of ‘Perceiving Emotion’ may be dissected as 
having preconscious, implicit, and automatized components. The preconscious component is 
the one responsible for the detection of emotional information in the environment without the 
individual being mindfully conscious of doing that. Individual differences could be analyzed 
by asking individuals to spontaneously recall emotional details of a situation or come up with 
explanations regarding the effect of emotion on behavior; high EI individuals would be 
expected to have greater awareness of emotional stimuli and their effect when attention is 
directed to them. Implicit processes in Perceiving Emotions come into play when individuals 
incorporate emotional information in the environment into thinking processes or behavior 
without being able to report that they have done so. Here, individual differences could be 
investigated using the subliminal presentation paradigm in which the presence of implicit 
processes would be revealed indirectly by the effect of the stimulus on subsequent 
performance/behavior, with the assumption that high EI individuals should manifest higher 
effects when the stimulus is emotional. Automatized processes may also play a role in 
Perceiving emotion. For instance, there is evidence that individuals may be trained to 
Automatic Processing in EI - 37 
 
consciously recognize microexpressions (Ekman, 2003). Emotional signals that initially 
escape awareness may become detectable through attention and learning. Yet, once 
individuals become experts in doing that, they may perceive emotional signals without being 
aware of their perception as the result of automatization.  
A line of research that well illustrates the different components of unconscious 
processes in EI is the one on lie detection. Experts in detecting deception may be considered 
examples of high EI individuals, particularly because of their use of nonverbal emotional 
cues to understand others’ true intentions and feelings (see O’Sullivan, 2005). Several studies 
assessed people’s ability to detect deception in experts such as police officers and individuals 
from law-enforcement agencies. On average, people’s ability to detect deception is slightly 
above chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006); good lie detectors use more nonverbal cues and 
microemotional signals, such as foot movement changes or variations in size of the pupils, to 
understand whether the person is truthful or not (DePaulo et al., 2003). From the analysis of 
the strategies used to identify liars, it was found that some of them were conscious and 
directly accessed by experts, such as observing liars’ eye gaze, which is also a strategy 
recommended in popular forensic textbooks (although not very helpful in deceiving liars); 
other strategies emerged through procedures that encouraged participants to think aloud and 
disclose the strategies they followed to catch deception. Indeed, some strategies are based on 
‘preconscious’ processes, that is, they may become accessible through deep thinking about it 
and attention.  
Of note, the fact that lie-catchers may access mental processes does not necessarily 
imply that those processes led to the correct detection. A growing body of evidence points 
out to that lie detectors may fail when asked to make explicit assessment of veracity and 
succeed more often when truthfulness is assessed through indirect measures, such as judging 
how much the liar was sympathetic, which captures a more spontaneous and immediate 
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evaluation of the target than the systematic approach of the ‘think aloud’ protocols (Granhag, 
2006). Collectively findings suggest that there may be aspects of lie-detection that escape 
conscious thinking and direct recall of strategies used to make a decision, but rely on gut 
feelings and intuitions as the main source of the correct decision (DePaulo & Morris, 2004; 
Granhag, 2006). It seems likely that such aspects are related to what Lieberman calls ‘social 
intuition’ (Lieberman, 2000), or the ability to make inferences about others’ feelings and 
intentions without having a conscious understanding of how these inferences were originated.  
The idea that behavior may be efficient and ‘intelligent’ without awareness is 
somehow counterintuitive: In the social psychology literature, unconscious processes are 
often associated with negative outcomes, such as prejudice and stereotyping. However, 
unconscious processes may lead to positive as well as negative outcomes depending on the 
characteristics of the individual, such as the content of the mental representations related to 
emotion, and the characteristics of the context. In fact, once a stimulus - whether coming 
from the internal world or perceived in the environment - activates emotion processing, 
emotion information may be processed without the perceiver being aware of its occurrence. 
At that point, what makes the difference between emotionally intelligent and emotionally 
unintelligent behavior is (a) the accuracy of beliefs relating emotion to behavior, which may 
have become tacit, that is, used in practical behavior but difficult to verbalize, and (b) how 
much such beliefs apply to the current situation.  
Mechanisms of emotional processing are supposed to be the same for all individuals, 
but individuals differ with respect to the level of awareness by which emotion information is 
processed and the content of emotion processes, which influence whether the outcome is 
positive or negative. Individuals with chronic egalitarian goals were able to counteract the 
activation of stereotypes (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Similarly, high EI 
individuals might have more accurate lay theories about the influence of mood/emotion on 
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behavior, which inform their conduct. Accurate lay theories include the acknowledgement 
that emotion may or may not relate to the target of evaluation, with consequences on how 
emotion reactions are integrated into decision-making and, in turn, affect behavior. With 
practice, managing emotions according to accurate beliefs might have become an 
unconscious and efficient source of ‘intelligent’ emotional behavior, as opposed to relying on 
mistaken lay theories as a guide for behavior in low emotionally intelligent individuals. Note 
that in this case the preconscious process of knowing of the effect of emotion on behavior 
would become accessible to awareness through attention and, after extensive practice, reach 
again the condition of unawareness due to highly proceduralized or automatized behavior. 
Individual factors, such as knowledge about emotion, are not the only ingredients 
influencing emotionally intelligent behavior: contextual factors also play a role. Contextual 
factors may provide cues to make the automatic response ‘situated’, as emotion concepts are 
not context-free and knowledge of appropriate emotional reactions originates in the context 
where such reactions occur (Barrett, 2006). Indeed, automatic responses are not immutable 
and rigid, but they are sensitive to the characteristics of the context as well as other 
characteristics, such as the perceiver’s goals and focus of attention (Blair, 2002). Cervone and 
colleagues found that some aspects of self-knowledge were relevant to certain contexts, but 
not others (Cervone et al., 2008). The knowledge appropriate for the situation at hand may be 
activated by environmental cues. For instance, Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne (1995) found 
that the same stimulus (a Chinese woman) could be automatically categorized in different 
ways (woman or Chinese) depending on contextual cues, such as chopsticks or makeup. The 
ability to use the right emotion knowledge in the right place at the right time is an important 
characteristic of high EI individuals as the positive outcome of emotion-based performance 
often depends on the context in which behavior occurs. Showing empathic reactions may be 
appropriate in cultures valuing emotion expressivity, but not in that endorsing emotion 
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suppression. The choice of which emotion content to bear on in a given situation may be 
done unconsciously and through integration of ‘background’ information, such as cultural 
norms, or peripheral emotion cues, such as faces expressing emotion as opposed to 
unexpressive faces. 
Another way in which contextual factors may influence emotion-based performance 
is by providing the conditions that enable conscious and automatic processing to occur. In 
general, any behavior is the result of both processes. Still, conscious processes are more 
likely to play a major role when there is plenty of time and availability of attentional 
resources; in such circumstances individuals may be able to consciously perceive stimuli and 
reflect on the effect of this perception on cognition and behavior. Conversely, when resources 
are scarce, such as when attention is captured by many stimuli at the same time or the person 
is engaged in multiple tasks, then automatic reactions are unlikely to be modified by 
conscious ones.  
In summary, a deeper understanding of which processes might constitute EI requires 
specification of which aspect of automaticity is under consideration and the mechanisms 
associated to it. Analysis of the awareness aspect has revealed that processes related to being 
aware of the cause, content, and effect of emotion requires distinct considerations and 
paradigms of investigation; furthermore, the exploration of the mechanisms associated to 
awareness or lack of it has uncovered some important source of individual differences in EI. 
As far as regards the issue of how the discussed automatic mechanisms may contribute to 
successful emotionally-based performance, I have proposed that both individual and 
contextual factors play a role.  
The New Look of EI: Considerations on How to Investigate It 
The picture of EI emerging from the analysis of automatic processes in affective 
experience is quite complex: Emotion processes underlying EI may be executed consciously 
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and automatically, interrelate with each other, and contribute differently to performance 
according to the characteristics of the person, such as sensitivity to emotional cues or beliefs 
about emotions, and characteristics of the situation, such as availability of attentional 
resources and contextual features in which the stimulus is embedded.  
Mayer and Salovey’s theory of EI has focused on analyzing individual differences in 
how individuals mindfully reason with emotion and reflectively use emotion to enhance 
thinking and behavior. Still, emotion processing includes automatic processes. To move 
forward, EI theory needs to take this fact into account as the first priority. In addition to 
developing models of EI that contemplate automatic emotion processing, researchers should 
specify which aspect of automaticity is the object of investigation and which processes 
contribute to it. In the present manuscript I have emphasized the feature ‘unconscious’ over 
the other characteristics of automaticity; yet, a thorough analysis of the contribution of other 
aspects - particularly of efficiency - to emotionally intelligent behavior would also be 
advisable to further explore the automatic component of EI. 
Concerning the issue of how to assess individual differences in automatic processes 
underlying EI, herein I suggest a way to proceed in this direction. It takes inspiration from 
what was called the cognitive correlates approach in cognitive psychology (see Pellegrino 
and Glaser, 1979) and is based on investigating emotion processes that are differentially 
related to high and low EI individuals.  
Groups of high and low emotionally intelligent individuals are identified and their 
performance in laboratory tasks is compared to see whether individuals differ with respect to 
how they process emotion information. Subgroups may be arranged according to scores on 
the EI test (the MSCEIT, being the most reliable ability test in circulation). Alternatively, a 
criterion measure different from performance on the MSCEIT may be employed to identify 
high and low EI individuals. In fact, as already mentioned, the risk of using an assessment 
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method mainly tapping into declarative knowledge of emotion such as the MSCEIT, is that 
individuals who have highly proceduralized emotion knowledge do not necessarily fall into 
the group of those who score high on the MSCEIT. A way to avoid this risk is to use an 
external criterion for identifying groups of high and low EI individuals. For instance, patients 
suffering from expressive agnosia, which is a pathology characterized by the inability to 
distinguish facial expressions, intonation and body language in others, or patients suffering 
from alexithimia, which is a deficit in describing and understanding one’s feelings, may 
represent the group of low EI.  
On the other extreme of the spectrum, highly emotionally skilled individuals might be 
identified according to a specific domain. In the domain of emotion understanding I already 
mentioned the experts in deceiving deception. In the domain of emotion regulation, good 
performers are those who are able to regulate their feelings according to the situation and use 
feelings to pursue their goal. Professional actors or professional athletes might well fall into 
this group as individuals who need to regulate feelings and use them appropriately to be good 
performer in their profession.  
Once target groups are identified, assessment methods may be compared within and 
between groups to understand how high and low EI individuals process emotion information. 
In choosing which laboratory task to use, researchers should consider which aspect of 
automaticity they are interested in and what underlying mechanism is associated to its 
occurrence. Considerations on the former define the domain of automaticity; on the latter 
provide information on whether individual differences in EI are more likely to occur at the 
conscious or automatic level.  Furthermore, researchers should also bear in mind the 
correspondence between the task they pick and the subabilities of EI the task refers to. For 
instance, the subliminal perception paradigm may be used to identify individual differences 
in Perceiving Emotion. Subliminal priming is based on displaying emotional pictures at very 
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brief presentation time immediately followed by a mask that has the function to delete the 
image of the prime in visual memory after the stimulus has disappeared. The hypothesis to 
test would be that high EI individuals are more sensitive than low EI ones to emotional, but 
not neutral, stimuli. Of note, the fact that a laboratory task is chosen to map into a specific 
subability of EI does not imply that correlations with the other subabilities would not be 
expected. In fact, experimental tasks are meant to tap into mechanisms of emotion 
processing, which may all be related to the abilities included in EI. Thus, accuracy in 
subliminal perception of faces would be expected to correlate with emotion perception as 
well as emotion regulation because individuals may regulate their behavior according to 
emotional stimuli perceived in the environment. Similarly, emotional contagion may be 
analyzed as a process common to emotion perception as well as emotion understanding 
because it may indicate perception of emotion in others but also interpretation of others’ 
emotions.  
Suggestions about which laboratory tasks may be better suited to study processes 
underlying EI come from the literature of priming and automaticity in social cognition (see 
Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and personality psychology (see Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). 
Laboratory tasks are based on indirect (or implicit) methods; that is, they rely on performance 
of mental processes as a measure of individuals’ characteristics as opposed to direct (or 
explicit) methods based on introspection and self-ratings. Because I already mentioned tasks 
that may be employed to analyze the unconscious aspect of automatic processing in EI, I will 
now turn to describe tasks well suited for testing other two aspects of automaticity, named 
efficiency and unintentionality.  
Being able to allocate processing resources to certain stimuli instead of others may be 
an important factor influencing emotionally intelligent performance. Attention determines 
where emotion processing starts. High EI individuals might have a preference for allocation 
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of attentional resources to emotional stimuli. Earlier I mentioned the relevance of paying 
attention to what one is feeling as a way to either integrate emotional reactions into thinking 
processes/decision-making and to regulate intensity of feeling (Seo & Barrett, 2007). 
Attention to emotional signals may be helpful to perceive microemotional signals that guide 
interaction with others, as Matsumoto and colleagues demonstrated (Yoo, Matsumoto, & 
LeRoux, 2006). Some measures of attention allocation employ time taken to react to a 
stimulus as an indication of the amount of resources devoted to it and for this reason are 
suitable for assessing the ‘efficiency’ aspect of automaticity. The lexical decision task is an 
example of such measures. Strings of letters that spell as a word or a nonword are presented 
and subjects indicate whether the string is meaningful or not. The claim that EI individuals 
automatically allocate attention to emotion stimuli implies that high EI individuals should be 
quicker to recognize a string that spells as an emotion word compared to nonword and neutral 
word spells. To distinguish the contribution of automatic and conscious processes on 
emotionally intelligent performance it would be helpful to vary the level of conscious 
awareness in each task, in a similar vain to the contrastive analysis proposed by Baars (1988).   
Other tasks helpful in revealing underlying processes are based on the manipulation 
of attentional demands. High EI individuals are characterized by using less cognitive effort to 
solve emotional problems (http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/). This claim may be 
tested using the dual-task paradigm: Subjects are asked to perform two tasks at the same time 
under conditions of loaded attention capacity (see also Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988 on 
cognitive busyness). An emotional task is automatic and efficient to the extent that it may be 
completed without being affected by a secondary task. One could test whether high EI are as 
effective in understanding someone’s feeling when under cognitive load as opposed to a 
situation in which they have full attentional resources available.  
Beyond attention allocation, accessibility of chronic beliefs about emotion is another 
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process underlying EI that might be analyzed with laboratory tasks. Chronically accessible 
constructs are those that are habitually activated. The association between representation of a 
situation and related behavior is strengthen with frequency of use and may become automatic 
and occur outside of awareness with practice (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994). Mental 
representations that individuals use to guide behavior are also known as naïve theories and, as 
a form of schemata, contain both declarative and procedural knowledge (Snow & Lohman, 
1989). Accessibility of schemas is increased by saliency and priming, and schemas are 
activated without intention and awareness. Inferences about the structure of schematic 
knowledge are based on assessing response time to associate emotion constructs. For 
instance, subjects may be required to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible which 
emotion may have influenced behavior in a certain situation: Speed of association is taken as 
an indication of accessibility of the emotion-behavior connection (Robinson, 2004). The ease 
with which individuals spontaneously come up with explanations of behavior may be another 
way to identify implicit theories about emotion, as is spontaneous recall of emotion details 
referenced in explanations of behavior. Because the activation of certain associations in 
memory is spontaneous, these techniques may be employed to reveal the unintentional 
component of automaticity in emotionally intelligent behavior. 
In summary, research in areas akin to EI provides insightful suggestions about how to 
expand the study of EI to include underlying processes. Laboratory tasks may be much more 
informative for understanding the nature of EI than the correlational studies that have 
dominated the field so far. Their employment is fundamental to reveal the underpinnings of a 
complex and fascinating construct such as EI.    
Implications for Future Research: A Research Agenda 
About thirty years ago Underwood (1975) suggested analyzing psychological 
processes in light of naturally occurring individual differences. More recently, the issue of 
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combining a process-oriented and an individual differences approach has been raised in 
emotion research (Gohm & Clore, 2000; Larsen, 2000): As a way to deepen the study of 
hypothesized processes, researchers are encouraged to not only manipulate variables, but also 
measure characteristics in which individuals may differ. In the present work I proposed to put 
into action this advice with respect to the study of EI. I contend that the analysis of individual 
differences in EI should be complemented by the investigation of how processes underlying 
EI operate in high versus low EI individuals. 
Within a process-oriented approach, I outlined a framework based on the distinction 
between conscious and automatic processes and discussed the importance of dissecting the 
automaticity component of EI according to the features of, as well as the mechanisms 
associated to awareness. This new look at EI expands and complements Mayer and Salovey 
original theorization in several ways: By looking into the processes underlying EI, it sheds 
light on mechanisms that might be responsible for differences in emotionally intelligent 
behavior, an aspect that has received little attention from current theorization and research. 
By investigating the relevance of automatic processing, and its interplay with conscious 
processing, it challenges the idea that EI should be thought of as a construct pertaining to the 
domain of consciousness. By combining a process-oriented and a differential approach, it 
expands the study of individual difference to the investigation of processes underlying such 
differences.  
Importantly, the present contribution provides a framework to guide further 
investigation in the field. Indeed, if automatic processing plays a role in EI, as I argue in this 
paper, then current research is missing an important aspect accounting for the construct and a 
source of variability in emotionally intelligent performance. Further research should take into 
account automatic processing to develop theory and assessment of EI.  
Evaluating Construct Validity of EI 
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Research should test the validity of the construct of EI as defined by conscious and 
automatic processes. The assertion that both conscious and automatic processes constitute EI 
would be supported if different methods used to measure EI converge toward the same 
underlying construct. More specifically, measures of EI such as the MSCEIT, and measures 
based on laboratory tasks such as the subliminal affective priming, should converge toward 
the same construct of EI.  
A multitrait-multimethod approach (MTMM; Campbell & Fiske, 1959) may be 
employed to test convergent validity. MTMM analyzes intercorrelations among two or more 
traits or constructs, and two or more measurement methods. With respect to EI, multiple traits 
would be the four abilities or branches of Mayer and Salovey (1997) model, whereas the 2 
methods would be measures based on conscious and automatic processing . By means of the 
correlation matrix between traits and methods, different patterns of relationship among 
variables may be analyzed, such as correlations between the two measures of EI for each 
trait, and correlations among the four abilities of EI within each method. Furthermore, the use 
of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to MTMM data allows to compare the goodness of 
fit between predicted and observed models representing the construct (Marsh, Martin, & Hau, 
2006). Competing models may be tested against each other as far as regard the expected 
overlapping of automatic and conscious processes. Measures based on conscious and 
automatic processes would be expected to show a mild correlation with each other; in fact, no 
task is process pure (Jacoby, 1991) and both type of processing are expected to influence any 
performance to some extent. Moreover, measures of conscious and automatic processes 
would be expected to load on the higher order factor of EI and correlate with more than one 
subability due to the fact that some underlying emotion processes may be in common with 
more than one subability of EI. 
Assessing Incremental Validity of EI 
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The distinction between conscious and automatic processes calls for testing the 
incremental validity of EI. The issue of whether EI predicts outcomes such as quality of 
interpersonal relationships, successful career, or academic achievement beyond personality 
and intelligence is controversial. Among research conducted on the ability model, some 
authors found support to incremental validity of EI (Lopes et al., 2004; Lopes, Salovey, & 
Strauss, 2003), while others found less encouraging results (Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006; 
Brackett and Mayer, 2003).  
The reconceptualization of EI according to a dual process framework provides another 
way to approach the issue: A portion of unexplained variance of previous studies might be 
accounted for by automatic processes, a component that, to the knowledge of the author, has 
never been included in any study on EI. In light of results found in research on the 
relationship between implicit and explicit processes in social and personality psychology 
(Perugini, 2005), I expect that automatic processing will account for unique variance in the 
criteria. Still, the weight of automatic processes depends on which performance conditions 
are appraised. Automatic processing should predict spontaneous emotionally intelligent 
behavior or behavior under scarce attentional resources, whereas conscious processing should 
predict deliberate behavior and action performed under availability of attentional resources. It 
is also possible that automatic and conscious processing interact to produce emotional 
intelligent behaviors.  
Exploring the Origin of Individual Differences in EI 
Further research should explore the antecedents of automatic and conscious emotional 
processing. Appraisal theories emphasize that emotions are elicited by evaluations of stimuli; 
such evaluations occur for the most part nonconsciously (Scherer, 2005). Emotion 
perception, use of emotion to facilitate thought, emotion understanding, and emotion 
regulation may arise from conscious and automatic appraisals of stimuli.  Because appraisal 
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processes depend on knowledge structures (Cervone, 2004), at the origin of individual 
differences in patterns of appraisal between high and low emotionally intelligent individuals 
there might be differences in emotion knowledge, as Wranik, Feldman Barrett, and Salovey 
(2007) suggest.  
Previous experience, and the cultural environment in which a person is embedded 
contribute to persons’ knowledge about emotion, and eventually shape their appraisal of 
situations. A situation may be interpreted in many different ways – and consequently 
determine different emotional experience – according to the context. For instance, the gesture 
of kissing on the cheek to greet a person may be perceived as appropriate and welcoming in 
some cultures, but intrusive and perhaps outrageous in others. Complex emotion knowledge 
might be associated with fine-grained appraisal processes, which ultimately lead to 
appropriate adjustment to the context (realizing when it is the case to kiss on the check to 
greet a person). High emotionally intelligent individuals might have more complex emotion 
knowledge than low emotionally intelligent ones, perhaps because they developed a wider 
range of associations between situations and appraisals, and/or because they possess a larger 
repertory of explanations for a certain event, and/or because they experienced the efficacy of 
different strategies in dealing with the situation. Of note, the complexity of emotion 
knowledge includes ‘knowing what’ and ‘knowing how’ of emotion, and the association 
between knowledge and appraisal works even when individuals are not aware of what 
determined their emotional reaction.  
Investigating the Relationship between Culture and EI 
 The extent to which EI may be considered culturally bounded is still open to debate 
(Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001). All human beings share the basic emotions of 
happiness, anger, fear, contempt, surprise, disgust, and sadness. Yet, the influence of culture 
on how such emotions are expressed, regulated, and even decoded is pervasive. The cultural 
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environment directs the focus of attention, and therefore the object of perception, toward 
emotional cues that are valued in a certain culture (Mesquita, 2003). Also display and 
decoding rules, or rules about how to express and interpret such emotions, vary a great deal 
across cultures (Matsumoto, Yoo, & Chung, 2007). Explicit and implicit norms about the 
most appropriate emotional responses in a given culture shape individuals’ reactions to 
emotion to the point that they become a spontaneous and automatic way to regulate emotions 
(Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007).  
Given the growing body of evidence that culture influences emotional experience, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether EI remains a key construct across cultures. Because emotions 
had played a fundamental role in human evolution (Darwin, 1872/1965), the ability to use 
emotions for one’s own advantage must be crucial in any culture. Yet, the manner in which 
being emotionally intelligent is conveyed may change according to cultural factors, such as 
social norms and customs. The study of EI across culture may reveal some important aspects 
of the construct, such as the universality of its features. For instance, individual differences in 
EI may be investigated as depending in part on the content of emotion knowledge, and in part 
on the mechanisms of emotion knowledge acquisition. A comparison of high emotionally 
intelligent individuals across countries might reveal that the former varies according to 
culture, whereas the latter functions the same way regardless of the country of origin.  
Another issue worth exploring across culture is the extent to which emotional 
adaptation may be due to unconscious processes, such as implicit learning. Implicit learning 
has been defined as “the acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independently of 
conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was 
acquired.” (Reber, 1993, as cited in Lieberman, 2000, p. 112). More specifically, Lieberman 
(2000) proposes to consider implicit learning as the cognitive basis of social intuition: 
individuals decode details of nonverbal behavior that provide crucial information about 
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others independently of conscious learning attempts.  Social intuition and implicit learning 
may be the keys of social and emotional adaptation, and they may be investigated studying 
individuals who changed their culture of origin, such as global managers or individuals who 
moved from their home country. Successful global managers might be characterized by 
greater plasticity for acquiring new emotion knowledge; for them adaptation to new 
environment should be faster and less costly than for common people, perhaps because once 
they (unconsciously) learned how to pick up emotion information in the environment, they 
were able to apply what they had implicitly learned to new situations and cultures and get a 
fairly good understanding of others’ intentions and feelings with little effort. 
Conclusion 
The construct of EI is located at the junction of three psychological domains: 
cognition, emotion, and social cognition. Most research on EI conducted to date has been 
developed within a differential approach, as is typical in studies of abilities in cognitive 
psychology (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004). This work represents an effort to merge 
this consolidated tradition of research in EI with a process-oriented approach, prevalent in 
emotion and social cognition studies. Arguing for the need to incorporate findings regarding 
automatic emotional experience with research on EI, I have proposed a framework based on 
the distinction between conscious and automatic processing. 
The major implication of reconceptualizing EI within this framework resides in 
guiding further research, first and foremost by encouraging the investigation of automatic 
processing. Ultimately, this paper calls for research exploring the automaticity component of 
emotional intelligence. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 52 
 
References 
Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000). Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in 
goal-directed behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 53-63. 
Amelang, M., & Steinmayr, R. (2006). Is there a validity increment for tests of 
emotional intelligence in explaining the variance of performance criteria? Intelligence, 3, 
459-468. 
Anderson, J. R. (1985). Cognitive psychology and its implications.  New York: 
Freeman. 
Ashkanasy, N. M. (Ed.) (2005). Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 4, 409-466. 
Ashkanasy, N. M., & Daus, C. S. (2005). Rumors of the death of emotional 
intelligence in organizational behavior are vastly exaggerated. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 26, 441- 452. 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bargh, J. A. (2007). Social psychology and the unconscious. New York: Psychology 
Press. 
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L., (2000). The mind in the middle: A practical guide to 
priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis and C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of 
research methods in social and personality psychology. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bargh, J. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1994). Environmental control of goal-directed 
action: Automatic and strategic contingencies between situations and behavior. In W. D. 
Spaulding (Ed.), Integrative views of motivation, cognition, and emotion. Nebraska 
symposium on motivation (Vol. 41) (pp. 71-124). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. 
 Bargh, J. A., & Williams, L. E. (2007). The nonconscious regulation of emotion. In J. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 53 
 
J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 429–445). New York: Guilford.  
Bar-On, R. (1997). The Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): A test of 
emotional intelligence. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems. 
Barrett, L. F. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience 
of emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 20-46. 
Barrett, L. F., & Salovey, P. (Eds.). (2002). The wisdom in feeling: Processes 
underlying emotional intelligence. New York: Guilford. 
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion 
shapes behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 167-203.  
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A.R. (2000). Emotion, decision making, and 
the orbitofrontax cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 295-307. 
Becker, T. (2003). Is emotional intelligence a viable concept? Academy of 
Management Review, 28, 192–195. 
Blair, I.V. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 242-261. 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-234. 
Bower, G. H. (1991). Mood congruity of social judgments. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), 
Emotion and social judgments ( pp. 31-53). Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.  
Brackett, M. A., & Mayer, J. D. (2003). Convergent, discriminant, and incremental 
validity of competing measures of emotional intelligence. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29, 1147-1158. 
Brackett, M. A., Mayer, J. D., & Warner, R. M. (2004). Emotional intelligence and its 
relation to everyday behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 1387-1402. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 54 
 
   Brackett M. A., Rivers, S. E., Shiffman, S., Lerner, N., & Salovey, P. (2006). Relating 
emotional abilities to social functioning: a comparison of self-report and performance 
measures of emotional intelligence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 91, 780–
95. 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by 
the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
   Carter, S., & Smith-Pasqualini, M. C. (2004). Stronger autonomic response 
accompanies better learning: a test of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. Cognition and 
Emotion, 18, 901–911.  
Caruso, D. R., Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P.  (2002).  Relation of an ability measure of 
emotional intelligence to personality. Journal of Personality Assessment, 79, 306-320. 
Cervone, D. (2004). The architecture of personality. Psychological Review, 111, 183-
204. 
Cervone, D., Caldwell, T., Fiori, M., Orom, H., Shadel, W., Kassel, J., & Artistico, D. 
(2008). What underlies appraisal?: Experimentally testing a Knowledge-and Appraisal model 
pf personality architecture among smokers contemplating high-risk situations. Journal of 
Personality, 76,  929-968.  
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-
behavior link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893-
910. 
Chartrand, T. L., Dalton, A., & Cheng, C. M. (2005). Consequences of nonconscious 
goal activation. In J. Shah & W. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science. New York: 
Guilford.  
   Cleeremans, A. (2004). Conscious and unconscious processes in cognition. In N. J. 
Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
Automatic Processing in EI - 55 
 
Sciences (pp. 2584-2589), London: Elsevier.  
Clore, G. L. (1994). Why emotions require cognition. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson 
(Eds.), The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions (pp. 181-191). New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Conte, J. M. (2005). A review and critique of emotional intelligence measures. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 433-440. 
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. 
New York: Avon Books. 
Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. C. (1991). Somatic markers and the 
guidance of behavior: theory and preliminary testing. In H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. 
L. Benton (Eds.) Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 Darwin, C. (1965). Expression of the emotions in man and animals. New York: 
Philosophical Library.  
Daus, C. S., & Ashkanasy, N. M. (2003). Will the real emotional intelligence please 
stand up? On deconstructing the emotional intelligence 'debate.' The Industrial and 
Organizational Psychologist, 41, 69-72.  
Davis, M., Stankov, L., & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional intelligence: In search of 
an elusive construct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 989-1015. 
Day, A., & Carroll, S. (2004). Using an ability-based measure of emotional 
intelligence to predict individual performance, group performance, and group citizenship 
behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 1443-1458. 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & 
Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118. 
DePaulo, B. M., & Morris, W. L. (2004). Discerning lies from truths: Behavioural 
Automatic Processing in EI - 56 
 
cues to deception and the indirect pathway of intuition. In P. A. Granhag & L. A. Strömwall 
(Eds.), The detection of deception in forensic contexts (pp. 15-40). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Derakshan, N., & Eysenck, M. W. (1999). Are repressors self-deceivers or other- 
deceivers? Cognition & Emotion, 13, 1-17. 
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18. 
Dimberg, U. (1997). Facial reactions: rapidly evoked emotional responses. Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 11, 115–123. 
Dimberg, U., & Thunberg, M. (1998). Rapid facial reactions to emotional facial 
expressions. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 39, 39–45. 
Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M., & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to 
emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science, 11, 86–8. 
Ekman, P. (1989). The argument and evidence about universals in facial expressions 
of emotion. In H. Wagner & A. Manstead (Eds.), Handbook of social psychophysiology (pp. 
143-164). Chichester: Wiley. 
Ekman, P. (2003). Emotions revealed. New York: Times Books. 
Erber, R., & Erber, M.W. (2001).  Mood and processing: A view from a self-
regulation perspective. In L. L. Martin & G. L. Clore (Eds.) Theories of mood and cognition. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1998). How to study thinking in everyday life: 
Contrasting think-aloud protocols with descriptions and explanations of thinking. Mind, 
Culture, and Activity, 5, 178-186. 
Evans, J. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 57 
 
Feldman, L. A. (1995). Variations in the circumplex structure of emotion. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 806-817. 
Feldman Barrett, L., Niedenthal, P. M., & Winkielman, P. (Eds.) (2005). Emotion and 
consciousness. New York: Guilford. 
Fox, E., Russo, R., Bowles, R. J., & Dutton K. (2001). Do threatening stimuli draw or 
hold visual attention in subclinical anxiety? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
130, 681-700. 
Freud, S. (1930/1961). Civilization and its discontents. New York: Norton. 
Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When 
person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 
733-740. 
Gohm, C. L., & Clore, G. L. (2000). Individual differences in emotional experience: 
Mapping available scales to processes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 679-
697. 
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). Emotion contagion. New York: 
Cambridge University. 
Granhag, P. A. (2006). Rethinking implicit lie detection. Journal of Credibility 
Assessment and Witness Psychology, 7, 180-190. 
Isen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes and social behavior. In L.  
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 203-253). New York:  
Academic Press. 
Isen, A. M., & Daubman K. A. (1984). The influence of affect on categorization. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1206-1217. 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from 
intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 58 
 
Jordan, P. J., Ashkanasy, N. M., & Hartel, C. E. J. (2003) The case for emotional 
intelligence in organizational research. Academy of Management Review, 28, 195-197. 
Katkin, E. S., Wiens, S., & Öhman, A. (2001). Nonconscious fear conditioning, 
visceral perception, and the development of gut feelings. Psychological Science, 12, 366-370. 
Koole, S. L., & Jostmann, N. B. (2004). Getting a grip on your feelings: Effects of 
action orientation and external demands on intuitive affect regulation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 87, 974-990. 
Lakin, J., & Chartrand, T. L. (2003). Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to 
create affiliation and rapport. Psychological Science, 14, 334-339. 
Landy, F. J. (2005). Some historical and scientific issues related to research on 
emotional intelligence. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26, 411-424. 
Larsen, R., J. (20000). Emotion and personality: Introduction to the special 
symposium. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 651-654. 
Liddell B. J., Williams, L. M., Rathjen, J., Shevrin, H., & Gordon, E. (2004). A 
temporal dissociation of subliminal versus supraliminal fear perception: An event-related 
potential study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 479 - 486. 
Lieberman, M. D. (2000). Intuition: A social cognitive neuroscience approach. 
Psychological Bulletin, 136, 109-137. 
Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 259-289. 
Locke, E. A. (2005). Why emotional intelligence is an invalid concept. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 26, 425-431. 
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychological 
Review, 95, 492-527. 
Logan, G. D. (1992). Attention and preattention in theories of automaticity. American 
Automatic Processing in EI - 59 
 
Journal of Psychology, 105, 317-339. 
Lopes, P. N., Brackett, M. A., Nezlek, J. B., Schütz, A., Sellin, I., & Salovey, P. 
(2004). Emotional intelligence and social interaction. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 30, 1018-1034. 
Lopes, P. N., Salovey, P., & Strauss, R. (2003). Emotional intelligence, personality, 
and the perceived quality of social relationships. Personality and Individual Differences, 35, 
641-658.  
Macrae, C. N., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Milne, A. B. (1995). The dissection of 
selection in social perception: Inhibitory processes in social stereotyping. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 397-407. 
Marsh, H. W., Martin, A. J., & Hau, K. T. (2006). A multiple method perspective on 
self-concept research in educational psychology: A construct validity approach. In M. Eid 
(Ed.), Handbook of psychological measurement. Washington DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Martin, L. L., & Erber, R. (Eds.). (2006). Psychological Inquiry. 17,3, 153-236. 
Matsumoto, D., LeRoux, J., Wilson-Cohn, C., Raroque, J., Kooken, K., Ekman, P., 
Yrizarry, N., Loewinger, S., Uchida, H., Yee, A., Amo, L., & Goh, A. (2000). A new test to 
measure emotion recognition ability: Matsumoto and Ekman’s Japanese and Caucasian Brief 
Affect Recognition Test (JACBART). Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 24(3), 179-209. 
Matsumoto, D., Yoo, S. H., Chung, J. (2007). The Expression of Anger Across 
Cultures. In Potegal, M., Stemmler, G., and Spielberger, C. (Eds.). Handbook of anger. New 
York: Springer. 
Matthews, G., Roberts, R. D.,  &  Zeidner, M. (2004).  Seven myths about emotional 
intelligence.  Psychological Inquiry, 15, 179-196. 
Matthews, G., Zeidner, M., & Robert, R. (2004). Emotional Intelligence: Science and 
Automatic Processing in EI - 60 
 
Myth. Cambridge: MIT. 
Mauss, I. B., Bunge, S. A., & Gross, J. J. (2008). Culture and automatic emotion 
regulation. In S. Ismer, S. Jung, S. Kronast, C. van Scheve, & M. Vanderkerckhove (Eds.), 
Regulating emotions: Culture, social necessity and biological inheritance (pp. 39-60). 
London: Blackwell Publishing. 
Mauss, I. B., Cook, C. L., & Gross, J.J. (in press). Automatic emotion regulation 
during anger provocation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 
Mauss, I. B., Evers, C., Wilhelm, F. H., & Gross, J. J. (2006). How to bite your 
tongue without blowing your top: Implicit evaluation of emotion regulation predicts affective 
responding to anger provocation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 589-602. 
Mayer, J. D. (2007). Emotional Intelligence Information. [WWW document]. URL 
http://www.unh.edu/emotional_intelligence/. Retrieved June 12, 2008. 
 Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D., R., & Salovey, P.  (1999).  Emotional intelligence meets 
traditional standards for an intelligence.  Intelligence, 27, 267-298.  
Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & 
D. Sluyter (Eds). Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Implications for 
educators (pp. 3-31). New York: Basic Books. 
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2002). Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) user’s manual. Toronto: MHS Publishers. 
 Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2004).  Emotional intelligence: Theory, 
findings, and implications.  Psychological Inquiry, 15, 197-215.  
Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D.R. & Sitarenios, R. (2001). Emotional 
intelligence as a standard intelligence. Emotion, 1, 232-242. 
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1972).  A measure of emotional empathy.  Journal of 
Personality, 40, 525-543. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 61 
 
Merikle, P. M., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J. D. (2001). Perception without awareness: 
Perspectives from cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79, 115-134.  
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. 
Science, 244, 933-938. 
Mesquita, B. (2003). Emotions as dynamic cultural phenomena. In R. Davidson & H. 
Goldsmith & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), The handbook of the affective sciences (pp. 871-890). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moon, S. M., & Lord, R. G. (2006). Individual differences in automatic and 
controlled regulation of emotion and task performance. Human Performance, 19, 327-356. 
Moors, A., & DeHouwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual 
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 297-326. 
Morris, J. S., Ohman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (1998). Conscious and unconscious 
emotional learning in the human amygdala. Nature, 393, 467- 470.  
Moskowitz, G. B., Gollwitzer, P. M., Wasel, W., & Schaal, B. (1999). Preconscious 
control of stereotype activation through chronic egalitarian goals. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 77, 167-184. 
Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (1993). Affect, cognition, and awareness: Affective 
priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64, 723-739.  
 Neubauer, A. C., & Freudenthaler, H. H. (2005). Models of EI. In R. Schulze & R. 
Roberts (Eds.) Emotional intelligence. An international handbook. Hogrefe. 
 Neumann, R., & Strack, F. (2000). "Mood Contagion": The automatic transfer of 
mood between persons. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 211-22. 
Nisbett, R., & Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 62 
 
 Öhman, A., Lundqvist, D., & Esteves, F. (2001). The face in the crowd revisited: A 
threat advantage with schematic stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 
381-396. 
O’ Sullivan, M. (2005). Emotional Intelligence and Detecting Deception: Why Most 
People Can't Read Others, but a Few Can. In Riggio, R. and Feldman, R. (Eds.) Applications 
of Nonverbal Communication. Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Perugini, M. (2005). Predictive models of implicit and explicit attitudes. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 29-45. 
Phelps, E. (Ed.). (2001). Emotion, 1, 3, 196-275. 
Phelps, E. (2005). The interaction of emotion and cognition: insights from studies of 
the human amydgala, in L. Feldman Barrett, P.M.  Niedenthal, & P. Winkielman (Eds.). 
Emotion and consciousness. New York: Guilford. 
    Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay on the  
cognitive unconscious. New York: Oxford University Press.  
  Roberts, R.,  Zeidner, M., & Matthews, G. M  (2001). Does Emotional intelligence 
meet traditional standards for an intelligence?  Some new data and conclusions. Emotions, 
1,196-231. 
 Robinson, M. D. (2004). Personality as performance: Categorization tendencies and 
their correlates. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 127-129. 
 Robinson, M. D., & Neighbors, C. (2006). Catching the mind in action: Implicit 
methods in personality research and assessment. In M. Eid & E. Diener (Eds.), Handbook of 
multimethod measurement in psychology (pp. 115-125). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition, 
and Personality, 9, 185-211. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 63 
 
Scherer, K. R. (2005). Unconscious processes in emotion: the bulk of the iceberg. In 
L. Feldman Barrett, P. M.  Niedenthal, & P. Winkielman (Eds.). Emotion and consciousness. 
New York: Guilford. 
Schneider, T. R., Lyons, J. B., Williams M. (2005). Emotional intelligence and 
autonomic self-perception: emotional abilities are related to visceral acuity. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 39, 853-861. 
Schwarz, N. & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, Misattribution, and Judgements of Well-
Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 45,513-523. 
Seo, M. G., & Barrett, L. F. (2007). Being emotional during decision-making: Good 
or bad? An empirical investigation. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 923-40. 
Smith, E. R., & DeCoster, J. (2000). Dual process models in social and cognitive 
psychology: Conceptual integration and links to underlying memory systems. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 4, 108-131. 
 Sonnby-Borgtröm, M., Jönsson, P., & Svensson, O. (2003) Emotional empathy as 
related to mimicry reactions at different levels of information processing. Journal of 
Nonverbal Behavior, 27, 3-23.  
Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1979). The role of category accessibility in the 
interpretation of information about persons: Some determinants and implications. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1660-1672. 
Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating conditions of 
human smile: A nonobstrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 54, 768-777. 
Sun, R., Merrill, E., & Peterson, T. (2001). From implicit skills to explicit knowledge: 
A bottom-up model of skill learning. Cognitive Science, 25, 203-244.  
Automatic Processing in EI - 64 
 
Sun, R., Peterson, T., & Merrill, E. (1996). Bottom-up skill learning in reactive 
sequential decision tasks. Proceedings of the 18th Cognitive Science Society Conference (pp. 
684-690). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Tamir, M., & Robinson, M. D. (in press). The happy spotlight: Positive mood and 
selective attention to rewarding information. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 
Underwood, B. J. (1975). Individual differences as a crucible in theory construction. 
American Psychologist, 30, 128-134. 
Van Rooy, D. L., & Viswesvaran, C. (2004). Emotional Intelligence: a meta-analytic 
investigation of predictive validity and nomological net. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65, 
71-95. 
Wiens, S., Mezzacappa, E. S., & Katkin, E. S. (2000). Heartbeat detection and the 
experience of emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 417-427. 
Winkielman, P., & Berridge, K. C. (2004). Unconscious Emotion. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 13, 120-123. 
Winkielman, P., Berridge, K. C., & Wilbarger, J. (2005). Emotion, behavior, and 
conscious experience: Once more without feeling. In L.F. Barrett, P.M. Niedenthal, & P. 
Winkielman (Eds.), Emotion and consciousness (pp. 335-362). New York: Guilford. 
Wranik, T., Barrett, L. F., & Salovey, P. (2007). Intelligent emotion regulation. In J. J. 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (p. 393-428). New York: Guilford. 
Yoo, S. H., Matsumoto, D., & LeRoux, J. A. (2006). The influence of emotion 
recognition and emotion regulation on intercultural adjustment. International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations, 30. 345-363. 
Zeidner, M., Matthews, G., & Roberts, R., D. (2001). Slow down, you move too fast: 
Emotional Intelligence remains an 'elusive' intelligence. Emotion, 1, 265-275.  
Zeidner, M., Matthews, G. M., & Roberts, R. D. (2003). Development of emotional 
Automatic Processing in EI - 65 
 
intelligence: towards a multi-level investment model. Human Development, 46, 69-96. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 66 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Automatic Processing in EI - 68 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Representation of how an individual differences approach may be combined with 
the analysis of conscious and automatic processing underlying emotional intelligence. 
Figure 2.The different components of automatic processing and their influence on 
emotionally intelligent behavior. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. The latter possibility is less likely than the former, because automatized performance 
may become available to consciousness by means of introspection or deliberative 
thinking. Still, a gap between the description of the steps needed to execute a task and 
the actual performance would be likely to occur. 
2. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
3. I am using a subjective criterion to define awareness for which there is awareness of a 
stimulus/process when the individual is able to verbally report its occurrence. 
4. The term direct (or explicit) and indirect (or implicit) measure is used according to 
Robinson and Neighbors (2006) for which implicit methods are based on 
performance, such as reaction times, whereas explicit methods are based on 
introspection or self-report. 
 
 
